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Abstract 
This paper illustrates the formal analysis of a simple protocol to convey critical data between 
the distributed solid state control elements in the signalling systems operated by Railtrack (British 
Railways). The analysis concentrates on temporal properties of the protocol, and one safety 
property in particular which informal analysis suggests can be violated in certain combinations 
of circumstances. A formal model is developed so that a rigorous, mathematically informed, 
assessment can be made as to whether the perceived violation of safety presents a significant 
hazard to railway traffic. The model is used to formulate possible strategies to overcome the 
problem. While demonstrating the power of the modelling process, this paper also illustrates 
the importance of conducting formal proofs: the failed attempt to prove safety in a corrected 
version of the protocol reveals a second logical flaw. Both flaws admit simple solutions. @ 1997 
Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Railway signalling engineers face a difficult distributed control problem. Traffic safety 
is invested in the control system, or interlocking, so that train drivers are required only 
to obey signals and speed limits. The task of the train dispatcher (signalman, or signal 
operator) is to adjust the setting of switches and signals to permit or inhibit traffic flow 
in running the network efficiently, but the interlocking has to be designed to protect 
the operator from inadvertently sending trains along conflicting routes. The railway can 
be run more securely if the operators have a broad overview of the network, and the 
distribtribution of trains within it. Since the introduction of mechanical interlockings in 
the late 1800’s the tendency has therefore been for control to become progressively 
centralised with fewer control centres individually responsible for larger portions of 
the network. In the last decade this trend has continued with Solid State Interlock- 
ing (SSI) introducing computer controlled signalling to mainline British railways [lo]. 
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Other railway authorities have adopted similar data driven solid state control elements 
in their interlockings [ 1, 13,2 1,241. 
In an extensive network there will inevitably be a requirement to divide the rail- 
way into a number of interlocking areas (or blocks). Where SSI is concerned this 
distribution of control is further necessitated by the limited capacity of the individ- 
ual processing elements-the practical upshot of which is that the network for which 
one operator is responsible will be divided between a number of interlockings. On 
this scale the divisions may be rather small so it is important that boundaries are 
transparent to the signal operators. In order for the control of a train to pass safely 
between interlocking areas a mechanism is needed to transfer information that needs 
to be shared about the status of the network in the fringe area. In particular, SSIs 
cooperate to allocate train routes that straddle their boundaries by means of an al- 
gorithm known as the remote route request protocol. This is the subject of our 
analysis. 
The work reported here was conducted in the context of a collaboration between 
British Rail Research and Edinburgh University while the author was engaged on a 
project to exploit theoretical computer science in solving industrially relevant devel- 
opment problems, generally within industrial timescales. Railway-related case studies 
have appeared in [6,20]. Although in itself a post hoc verification of established system 
components, the present case study is best understood as a contribution to the earliest 
design stages since its tenor is very much that it clarifies the design. We shall illustrate 
the depth of understanding of a system that can be readily obtained through applied 
formal methods. Safety of railway traffic is the primary concern, but this term has a 
rather narrow interpretation in a mathematical model. Although we reveal design flaws 
in the remote route request protocol, there is little doubt that SSI has demonstrated its 
safety in practice. The formal analysis goes some way towards explaining why this is 
the case, and highlights design considerations which were apparently overlooked when 
the system was first developed. British Rail’s inquiry into the safety implications was 
instigated and informed by the work presented here, but their results are not presently 
available. 
Section 2 explains enough about railway signalling for the reader to appreciate what 
the remote route request protocol is supposed to achieve. This inevitably introduces 
some strange terminology, but the concepts underlying interlocking design at this level 
of abstraction will have a familiar feel to many computer professionals. Sections 3 
describes the protocol informally, and demonstrates that under some (albeit rather ex- 
treme) circumstances it fails to prevent the system from entering unsafe states. What 
‘unsafe’ means in this context is described in Section 3.3, and formally expressed as a 
temporal property of the model developed in Section 5. We shall work in the frame- 
work of CCS and the modal p-calculus which are briefly reviewed in Section 4. The 
analysis in Section 6 yields important insights into the circumstances under which we 
may consider the remote route request protocol to be ‘safe’; it also suggests modifica- 
tions to the algorithm which are proved to guarantee safety in the model. The likely 
impact of these findings is discussed in the concluding Section 7. 
2. Railway 
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Cribbens [lo] describes in detail the overall organisation of SSI, and the philosoph- 
ical and technical problems that have had to be overcome in its design. This section is 
intended only to give the reader a feeling for the principles by which the system oper- 
ates. The main ideas to carry forward are the notions of route locking, route release, 
and the major cycle: these are important for understanding the protocol described in 
the next section. 
2.1. Principles of route setting 
At the signal control centre a continually updated panel displays the current distri- 
bution of trains in the network, and the current status of signals. The railway layout is 
depicted schematically much as in Fig. 1 (the conceptual division into EAST and WEST 
is explained later). Signals (,!$) on the control panel appear on the left in the direction 
of travel, each signal has a lamp indicator, and each main signal has a button. Switches 
(points, Pi) are drawn to show their normal position-the other position is called re- 
verse. The operator selects a route by pressing the button at the entrance signal (e.g., 
S,), then pressing the button at the exit signal-the consecutive main signal and en- 
trance signal for the next route (Ss, for the route known as R,,). This sequence of events 
is recognised as a panel route request, and is forwarded to the SSI for interpretation. 
The operator can similarly issue a (route) cancellation request for a preselected route. 
Route requests are initially stored in a ring buffer; when subsequently processed 
the software interprets the availability conditions for the route which are specified by 
rules held in a database within the SSI. For the example above these geographic data 
include the fragments: 
*Q28 if (Pzcr or QP2R),(P3cn or QP3N),Tibf ,TFf 
then R281,P2cr,P3cn,T5Ca1,T66a1,T7C(11,Tg6a1 fi. 
*P2R T c Tabf Tbaf. 
‘P3N Ts c’Th’Tzbf I 71 37 . 
EAST 
WEST 
Fig. 1. Part of a signal control panel with additional sub-route annotations. 
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The label ‘*q28 is the entry point for the interpreter when it evaluates the request for 
R,,; execution continues without interruption to the ‘ . ’ which terminates the data block 
(just a guarded command in this case). The first guard checks that the control variable 
representing the points P2 is in the state cr-meaning the points are ‘controlled’ reverse 
in the SSI (the physical switch may or may not be reverse at this time). If this variable 
is in the wrong state the interpreter evaluates the conditions under which the points can 
be moved to the reverse position (by jumping to the data referenced at ‘*P2R’). The 
second guard is similar for the points P3 are required normal. The last two conditions 
test sub-routes-these are Boolean control variables defined for each path through a 
track section that lies on a route. Sub-routes are either locked (1) or free (f). There 
are four sub-routes associated with track section r, for example, and Ttb (through T, 
in direction ab) will be a component of several routes. Thus, the conditions under 
which the points Pz can be moved to the reverse position are that the track section is 
clear of traffic (T, c), and the normal sub-routes through this track section are free. 
No action will be taken if any of the guards in the rule are false-the failed route 
request will be forgotten. If all the guards are passed the control variables will be 
assigned in the command: the route (variable R,,) and its sub-routes are locked, and 
the points are controlled reverse and normal as required. At this stage the route itself 
is said to be locked: no conflicting route should be locked concurrently, and a (safety 
critical) property of the interlocking that should be verified is that no conflicting route 
can be locked concurrently. This property is important because route locking is a 
necessary precursor to route setting which the interlocking carries out automatically 
through dialogue with the track-side hardware (also under geographic data control). 
Firstly, the points on the route are called into correct alignment. Secondly, the route 
must be proved-this involves checking that points are properly aligned, that lamp 
filaments in the signals are drawing current, and that signals controlling conflicting 
routes are on (red). Finally, the entrance signal will be switched off when the route is 
clear of other traffic-a driver approaching the signal will see it change from red to 
a ‘proceed’ aspect (green, yellow, etc.), but a signal will not display a proceed aspect 
unless an onward route has been locked. 
2.2. Polling cycles of the SSI 
Solid State Interlocking is a multi-computer system whose central (safety critical) 
processing elements operate in repairable triple modular redundancy: each processor is 
identical, runs identical software, and redundantly compares three sets of system out- 
puts. Interlocking processors are directly connected to track-side equipment (see Fig. 2) 
by means of a baseband data highway (twisted pair). Track-side modules interface with 
signals and points to provide power switching under micro-processor control. These and 
other hardware elements and data paths are duplicated for reasons of availability and 
fault tolerance. 
The operation of the system is organised around the concept of a major cycle. 
During this period the controlling computer will exchange messages with each piece 
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Interlocking Processor 
Book- 
Keeping 
- Panel 
In: Stahls of the Nehvork 
I 
Points 
Out: Commands toSignals/Points 
1 Baseband Data IQhway I 
Signals Track Circuits 
Fig. 2. The overall organisation of the Solid State Interlocking. 
of signalling equipment to which it is attached. The major cycle is a sequence of (64) 
minor cycles marked by the arrival of one data telegram from the network, and the 
generation of one outgoing command telegram to drive the track-side equipment to the 
desired state. The SSI has other business to attend to during a minor cycle: it performs 
all redundancy management, self-test and error recovery procedures; updates system 
(software) timers; and exchanges data with external devices such as the control panel 
and the internal data link (see Section 3). 
The minor cycle has a minimum duration of 9.5ms, but SSI can operate reliably 
with a major cycle of up to about 1 s and a minor cycle of up to 30ms. This flexibility 
is needed for handling panel requests. If the required minor cycle activities can be 
completed in under 9.5 ms the SSI will process one of any queued panel requests-but 
if a minor cycle is too long the track-side equipment will interpret the gaps as faults, 
and may revert to the safe state in error. To avoid this a detailed timing analysis of the 
geographic data is conducted during the design phase, facilitated by the simple design 
of the language in which the data are expressed (e.g., there are no loop constructs). 
2.3. The sub-route release mechanism 
During each minor cycle the SSI has also to perform a certain amount of bookkeep- 
ing. Returning to the example, note that once a train has passed the entrance signal 
(S,, or if the route is cancelled by the operator) the tracks behind the train can be 
released and made available to other routes. This is achieved by commands listed in 
the geographic data-but whereas route requests are only evaluated on demand, these 
sub-route release data are evaluated once a major cycle: 
if Rz8f,T5c then Tyf fi. 
if Tpf,Tyf,T6c then Tpf fi. 
if Tgbaf,T7c then Tyf fi. 
These introduce the following principle: the first sub-route on a route can be released 
as soon as the route has been unlocked (R,, f) as long as the track section is clear of 
traffic (T, c); subsequent sub-routes are released in order of traversal (Tp, Ty, and 
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lastly T,b”). It is essential that the sub-route release data specify the sequence correctly, 
but the order in which the rules are executed does not matter-more precisely, the 
(safe) behaviour of the interlocking should not depend on the order of execution. 
2.4. Safety properties and software validation 
Geographic data are evidently safety critical since they govern all signalling decisions 
of the interlocking. Safety properties of the data have already received some attention in 
the literature. The author’s own contribution [20] examines static properties of the data 
by embedding the language and its program logic in higher-order logic, and uses the 
tactics of the HOL theorem prover [12] to fully automate the invariance proofs. Ingleby 
and Mitchell [ 151 approach the problem by modelling the data/control combination as 
a (large) finite state machine, and pay careful attention to data decompositions to 
efficiently search the state space for unsafe states. Related work is reported in [9]. 
Other data driven computer controlled signalling systems have also been studied. A 
particularly success has been the collaboration between ABB Signal and StHlmark et al. 
at Logikkonsult [24] who have developed dedicated propositional logic theorem provers 
to verify safety related properties for the Swedish State Railway. The Sterno1 language 
used in the design of these interlockings is similar to the geographic data (language), 
though somewhat simpler. More recently Groote et al. [ 131 have used Logikkonsult’s 
tools to verify safety properties of the Vital Processor Interlocking (Dutch Railways), 
whose computational model is similar to that of Sterno1 (guarded commands executed 
in strict sequence, but without randomly accessed data). 
The techniques used to validate the SSI generic program (only the data are changed 
between installations of the system) have been reported by Short [23] who points out 
the need for extensive testing of the final hardware and software combination since 
the software performs safety checks, redundancy management, etc., on the hardware. 
Although informal the validation effort described is very thorough, and aided by the 
modular design of the program that favours polling mechanisms to preemption mecha- 
nisms throughout (it occupies about 20 k bytes). The relevance is that in the sequel we 
shall investigate a safety critical algorithm that is partly implemented in data, and partly 
in the generic program-so making its properties difficult to verify by considering these 
aspects of the SSI software in isolation. 
3. The coordination of distributed control 
In order for the control of a train to pass safely between interlocking areas adjacent 
SSIs exchange data over a high-speed bus called the Internal Data Link (IDL). Several 
interlockings can be connected to a single bus, synchronising their transmissions in 
accordance with a round-robin protocol (we shall not investigate this layer of the 
inter-SSI communications). These messages, or remote route requests, are prepared by 
commands in the geographic data and are consequently buffered before transmission. 
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(1)s *QN if @CN-E,E=stop then E=O,G=IQN( fi. 
(2)E *AN if OCN-E,E<S then @SN-E,T~C1 fi, ZFl,E=stop . 
(3)~ *QN if @CN-W,E=stop then @SN-W,T$*l,Z{*l,E=3,G~ fi. 
(4)E *AZ if Tgcf then Zyf fi. 
(5)~ *QZ if E=stop then Zl*f,G=m fi. 
(6)~ if E>5 then E=stop fi. 
(7)~ if Z$l,Tl’f,E=stop then Gm fi. 
(8)wif Zibf,T8c then Tg*f fi. 
Fig. 3. Axiomatising remote route requests (rules for EAST, WEST, or both). 
The generic program copies these messages to the link at least once a major cycle. 
Inputs from the link are queued just as the control panel inputs. 
A typical situation to focus the discussion is illustrated in Fig. 1 where EAST and 
WEST communicate to set cross-boundary routes-.g., R,, between signals S, and 
S,. In general there will be numerous lines and routes linking the two interlockings, 
but only one telegram (each way) is normally required to achieve all route locking 
functions. The protocol described below has two phases since it deals firstly with 
locking cross-boundary routes, and secondly with releasing them again. We shall not 
be concerned here with the mechanism by which such routes are set once they are 
locked-further telegrams convey continuously required information for this purpose 
(such as the status of signals and tracks in the fringe area). 
The elements of the protocol are implemented in geographic data by the rules in 
Fig. 3 which have been abstracted from the guidelines in [4]. The first five are ‘panel 
requests’ executed only on demand; the others are ‘sub-route release data’ executed 
once a major cycle. On each side of the protocol there is an ‘elapsed’ timer E, a 
telegram G, and a special sub-route Z whose purpose is described below. The timers 
count seconds, roughly, but cannot be updated by the real-time software more than 
once a major cycle. Also, since we can distinguish a timer that is running from one 
that is stopped (‘stop’ is the maximum value the variable can hold), the timers act as 
semaphores to ensure the various uses of the telegram do not interfere. 
3.1. Locking routes over interlocking boundaries 
The process is initiated by the signal operator selecting the cross-boundary route. The 
panel request is handled by EAST since this interlocking controls the entrance signal 
for the route: 
(1) EAST must first evaluate the availability conditions ‘*CN-E’ in its portion of the 
network. If the route is available EAST waits until certain that the second part is 
also available before locking the first: EAST issues a remote route request to WEST 
(QN), and starts its timer. One of the availability conditions is that the timer is not 
already running (E= stop). If no acknowledgement from WEST is received within 
154 M. J. Morley I Science of Computer Programming 29 (1997) 147-170 
*QN [Ml *AN (6) EAST 
_-___ _-_-- 
: : :: 
.: :: 
i 
f+ FQSTAN 4 b E=Stop 4 
(3) 
(2) 
[QNI *AN 
Fig. 4. Normal sequence of events in making remote route requests. 
the prescribed period this timer will timeout by a special rule (6) implemented in 
the sub-route release data (E >5 is true if five or more seconds have elapsed). 
WEST receives an IDL input and translates this into a route request which is placed 
in its input buffer. When this is subsequently processed the availability conditions 
include a check that WEST’S timer is not running. If it is available WEST locks this 
second part of the route, starts its timer, and writes an acknowledgement (AN) for 
EAST (the purpose of the dummy sub-route 2, ab is explained later). The timer in 
WEST is started here to ensure this reply telegram will be transmitted-otherwise 
it might be overwritten by a request for a WEST to EAST route before the transport 
layer has posted the reply. 
In EAST the acknowledgement is also treated as a remote route request: on this 
occasion EAST proceeds to lock the route it had originally requested as long as 
the availability conditions have not changed in the meantime (that would be very 
unusual), and as long as the timer is (still) running. Whether or not the route 
is locked in this action, the timer is stopped, and the dummy sub-route .ZF is 
locked. This special sub-route is used in the negotiation between EAST and WEST 
to release the cross-boundary route. 
This sequence of events is summarised in Fig. 4 where the ticks on the timelines 
indicate seconds-i.e., moments at which the timers are updated by the generic pro- 
gram. According to [4] this happens at most once a major cycle (which can therefore 
be no longer than the space between the ticks). The figure illustrates the point that the 
telegrams are buffered before being posted, but they will always be posted within one 
major cycle of being written. 
3.2. Releasing routes ouer interlocking boundaries 
Once a train has passed the entrance signal the sub-routes along the route should be 
freed in the manner described in Section 2.3. At least, the sub-routes can clear in this 
way up to the boundary: T,aC is a control variable in EAST, while Tib is in WEST, so the 
usual sub-route release mechanism cannot free the ‘inward’ sub-route. Instead, EAST 
automatically generates a cancellation request for WEST to release the second part of 
the route when the correct circumstances obtain: 
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(7) If the outward dummy sub-route (2,““) is locked EAST will write a cancellation 
request telegram (QZ) for WEST in every major cycle that the last real sub-route 
(T,““) is free and the timer stopped. EAST will take no steps to free the dummy 
sub-route until an acknowledgement is received from WEST. Here, the timer is not 
started-so the cancellation request may be overwritten by another message from 
EAST to WEST. 
(5) Whenever WEST receives an IDL input it is translated into a route request which is 
placed in its input buffer. When this is a request to cancel the inward route, WEST 
does so by unlocking the inward dummy sub-route (Ztb) under the condition that 
its timer is not running. WEST acknowledges the request with a reply telegram (AZ) 
to EAST, but does not start the timer (so the reply is not guaranteed to be posted). 
Rule (8) is the sub-route release datum for the real inward sub-route Tlb; the sec- 
ond part of the route will be released by the mechanism described in Section 2.3. 
(4) When EAST receives an IDL input it is translated into a route request and placed 
in the input buffer. When this is the acknowledgement o a cancellation request to 
WEST the interlocking frees the dummy outward sub-route as long as the real one 
is (still) free. This completes the release phase of the protocol, and cancellation 
requests will cease to be generated by EAST since the conditions in rule (7) are 
no longer satisfied. 
There are thus eight generic rules the signalling engineer has to encode in geographic 
data when using the remote route request protocol. Rules (1) and (2) are instantiated 
for each outward route; rule (3) is instantiated for each inward route; the other rules 
are instantiated once for each line joining the two interlockings-except (6) which is 
instantiated only once for each timer/telegram. No other geographic data should update 
the telegrams (G), the timers (E), or the dummy sub-routes needed to implement 
remote route release. The route-specific availability conditions, and route locking com- 
mands, are inserted at the place-holders OCN-E, OSN-W, etc., but do not concern us 
here. Finally, note the mechanism giving precedence to route requests over cancella- 
tion requests+ach rule that writes a telegram first checks the timer is stopped, but 
only ( 1) and (3) start the timer. 
3.3. Safety 
It is the signal engineer’s responsibility to ensure that the elements of the protocol 
are correctly used, but who is to ensure that the protocol is “safe”? In addressing 
this issue it is pertinent to first ask what safety means in this context. At a human 
level of interpretation one would consider the system trustworthy if it is not prone to 
failure, there being an (essential) temporal component to the inquiry. However, since 
we deal here with a highly technical artefact the question can be sharpened. Clarifying 
the informal guidelines [4] the desired property is that: 
l the remote route request protocol ensures the cross-boundary route is locked only 
if it is available in both interlockings, and 
l it is not possible to arrive at a situation where only the first half is locked. 
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[Ml (6) *AN EAST 
I 2 3 4 5 
I I _-_-- I I I I I 
_____ 
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b POSTQN +j b E=Stop 4 
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:: :: 
:: : :: 
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I 
Fig. 5. Protocol failure: matters are as in Fig. 4, but with longer delays. 
The difficulty, as the reader may have guessed, is that the protocol fails to meet 
the second of these objectives. Given EAST’S timeout (rule 6 in Fig. 5), the second 
rule, ‘*AN’, will fail the E ~5 test so the route will not get locked--the route release 
mechanism (rule ‘7) will free the route in WEST because of the command ZT 1 in 
(2). Indeed, the second part of the route may already have been released (sparing the 
details, the right circumstances for this can arise if the route is being reselected while a 
train is en route). But this is not the only action that can intervene between the timeout 
and processing the reply from WEST. The second panel request shown in the lower part 
of the figure raises some concern if it restarts the timer-because the delayed reply 
will then succeed, other things being equal, even though it should have expired. This 
leaves the route locked in EAST but free in WEST. 
The consequences of this failure are difficult to predict as they depend on the pre- 
vailing geographic conditions. In principle S, could change to a proceed aspect before 
the information that the route is cancelled in WEST is returned to EAST, but this haz- 
ardous state will prevail for no more than a second or two if the rules governing 
signal aspects have been correctly implemented [4]. One possible consequence of set- 
ting R,, in EAST while it is free in WEST can be seen in Fig. 1; the conflicting 
route R,, may be locked, causing WEST to move P, reverse, but any train approach- 
ing from EAST requires the points normal and may be derailed if they are incorrectly 
aligned. 
This (mis)behaviour of the remote route request protocol is sufficiently unexpected 
to warrant deeper investigation. To put our understanding of the protocol on a rigorous 
foundation we therefore propose to develop a formal model. This will serve as a 
vehicle for proving remote route locking can be safely implemented. We shall express 
the model in CCS [18], a very suitable language in which to investigate the behaviour 
of communication protocols, and which provides the mathematical basis of the IS0 
standard protocol specification language LOTOS [3]. The next section briefly recalls 
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the main combinators of the language, and their semantics, and explains the temporal 
logic in which properties of the model will be formalised. 
4. CCS and the modal ~-calculus 
Timing properties of communicating systems can be explored in the process algebraic 
setting with languages such as TCCS [19] and Timed CSP [22] which introduce discrete 
or continuous domains of ‘time transitions’. In these models either computation happens 
or time progresses, but not both together. Where the events that clock a system are 
discrete, for example in synchronous hardware where a global clock signal defines the 
frequency with which all system components change state, the weaker time model of 
SCCS [17] or MEIJE [I I] may offer the right kind of temporal abstraction. In such 
models all system components proceed in lockstep whether or not they communicate, 
computation always coinciding with the clock’s tick. 
The natural clock of the SSI is the major cycle. Not only does this define the 
frequency with which the interlocking and the track-side hardware exchange fresh data, 
but it also defines the maximum frequency at which the system’s timers can be updated. 
This is a crucial point since the behaviour associated with the remote route request 
protocol does not therefore depend on the number of seconds that have passed since 
the IDL telegram was written, but on the number of times the timer has been updated. 
We need not, therefore, introduce real time to the model a priori, and so develop our 
understanding of the system within the asynchronous framework of CCS. 
4.1. The calculus of communicating systems 
To begin with a relevant example, suppose that we wished to represent a register 
(or variable in a program) whose possible values are drawn from a set Y. The agent 
Reg(u) def $(u).Reg(u) + put(v).Reg(v) u E V 
achieves this, and introduces action prefix (aS), nondeterministic choice (P + Q), and 
the principle of constant definition (A d$f P). Intuitively, the behaviour of the agent aS 
is that it may perform the action a and thereafter behaves as P. This is after written 
a.P A P, meaning US and P are related by the (labelled) transition relation z . 
The first action of the agent P + Q is governed by the first actions of P and Q. Thus, 
P+ Q -f-+ P’ whenever P -% P’, and P+ Q -% Q’ whenever Q 5 Q’. The principle 
of constant definition states that A behaves just as P whenever A dzf P. Note that A 
can appear in P, as with Reg(u) above, and that this introduces non-finite behaviour 
through recursion. 
The definition above gives rise to a family of (mutually recursive) agents, one 
- 
for each value the register can take. The action get is intended to model the ac- 
cess operation that allows one to read the register; put is to update the register. We 
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may conveniently think of these as channels by which values can be communicated 
between processes. The usual convention is that Z represents output, and a represents 
input. Two (parallel) agents may synchronise if they can simultaneously perform com- 
plementary actions: 
IA X I Reg(w) 
PutWX I RegW 
/ 
put(w) 
- X I RegW 
PNfJ) - 
- PWwW I Reg(u) 
I set(u) - - pWw)X I RegW 
Synchronisation is pair-wise and always denoted by the distinguished action r. The 
other possible transitions are due to the actions the two agents can perform indepen- 
dently: the CCS parallel composition has interleaving semantics. 
The third case above shows that the register may (in principle) be updated by an 
agent external to the pair. To avoid such interference it is possible to restrict the 
behaviour of an agent. Suppose L = {put(v) ( u E V}, then: 
T 
W(wW I Reg(u))\L 
- W I RegW)\L 
% (put(w)X 1 Reg(u))\L 
This gives put(w)X exclusive write access to the register, but anyone may read it. 
The semantics of this operator is succinctly expressed by: P\L -% P’\L whenever 
P 5 P’ with a, ?i $ L. The semantics of CCS terms are given by labelled transition 
systems: states are agents, and labels (actions) are drawn from a set A B {r} with the 
property that a E A iff Z t A, and for all a E A, a = Z. Note that r $Z L for any 
restriction set L. 
Modelling SSI: Let us immediately make use of these constructs to define a simple 
model of the SSI’s control loop. The model has two components: a program called 
Data, and a memory upon which it operates called Image. The former is derived by 
translating the geographic data into CCS; the latter is just the collection 9 of all control 
variables defined (representing points, routes, sub-routes, etc.): 
Control kf (Data I Image)\L 
Now C and n generalise the binary choice and parallel composition operators. Let 
Image be defined by the composition nDEg RegD(v), suitably initialised. However, 
in order to express properties of the model in terms of its state variables we need to 
leave the Image readable-but Data should not access memory from anywhere other 
than Image. For this reason we instead use the following, observable, registers: 
RegD(u) dAf i$,(u).Reg&u) + putJu).Reg(v) + &&(u).Reg,(u) 
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- - 
and let L = {get,(v),put,(u) 1 D E 9,~ E V} to leave the Image only observable 
through the ohs actions. 
The agent Data defines an endless do loop that nondeterministically chooses and 
executes one of the rules in the geographic data on each iteration. The state Data can 
be thought of as the ‘top’ of the minor cycle loop in this recursive definition: 
Data fZf set(Q).(C[ PRR(*Q) IData) + C (C[ SRR(T/) IData) 
T’ 
The intention is that the action set(Q) invokes the panel (route) request ‘*Q’ from the 
database. PRR is the collection of panel request data, and SRR is the collection of 
sub-route release data. The translation into CCS is inductively defined but will not be 
described in detail beyond the clauses 
C(Il D v ]s = put,(u).s 
T[ D v j(s, f) = get,(u).if (u = u) then s else f 
which generate CCS from simple tests and assignments, and 
C[ if t then c f i 1s = T[ t ](C[ c ns,s) 
CII cl , c2 ns = CII cl nm c2 54 
TI[ t1 3 t2 ne, f) = TU t1 llCuI t2 nh f), f) 
TlItl o=hll@,f) =TUtl I (s,TUt2ll(s,f)) 
which yield the semantics of the guarded command, sequence, and the Boolean tests 
(appealing to ‘continuations’ s and f to represent the next states). The interested reader 
should consult [ 18, Chapter 81 for an illustration of how to interpret a simple imperative 
language in CCS. The Geographic Data Language, however, is no more expressive than 
suggested by the above clauses, and the translation is easily seen to be mechanised 
(terms like ‘QP2R’ are treated simply as abbreviations). 
The Control model derived by this construction is nondeterministic. There are two 
reasons for this: firstly, because panel requests are only ever executed on demand; 
secondly, because we do not wish to impose any particular execution order on the 
sub-route release data (in SSI the order is fixed, but arbitrary). This model will be 
elaborated in Section 5 below, after first introducing the logic with which to express 
its properties. 
4.2. Modal temporal logic 
The modal p-calculus [ 161 is a powerful logic for expressing temporal properties of 
systems modelled as transition systems. The logic subsumes the familiar program logics 
such as Floyd-Hoare logic and PDL, as well as branching time temporal logics like 
CTL. Bradfield [5] gives a concise introduction to the power and range of application 
of the modal p-calculus. 
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Stirling’s formulation [25] is obtained by enriching Hennessy-Milner logic [14] with 
modalities that are indexed by sets of actions, and by adding propositional variables 
(Z) and an explicit fixed point operator: 
@, Y ::= z 1 4 1 @A Y ) [K]@ 1 vZ.@ 
A restriction to ensure vZ.@ is a (greatest) fixed point is that Z must occur within an 
even number of negations if it appears free in @. Models for this logic are given by 
labelled transition systems (9, ($1 a E A}), w h ere 9 is a set of states (agents), and A 
is a set of labels (actions). The meaning of an assertion @ is a set of states ]]@l]y- C 9, 
defined relative to a valuation V that assigns a meaning-a set of states-to the free 
propositional variables: 
IIZIIY = “QZ) 
IWIlY = 9 - II@IIY 
II@ A ‘yllv = ll@llv ” II Yllv 
IIvwIIY- = P E 9 I w? G Il@llvI 
II~Z.@llv = U{& G 9 I &G II@IIY{ZHb}~ 
The set K(P) %f {P’ E 9 I P 3 P’ for some a E K} is the set of K-successors of the 
state P. Temporal properties of systems are expressed by closed formulae (no free Z, 
although this can be relaxed), and P has the property @ iff P E ll@ll~. This is usually 
written P k @, and we omit the V when it is not relevant. 
The reader may wonder whether the truth constants tt and fs have been overlooked. 
They have not. In fact, tt and vZ.Z express the same property: from the semantics 
]IvZ.ZII = 9, and the only property all states enjoy is the property true. We let tt kf 
vZ.Z, and fs dAf Ttt whose meaning is the empty set-no state can have the property 
false. Other dual operators are defined using negation as usual-in particular, pZ.@ cf 
-vZ.l@{lZ/Z} is the least fixed point operator, and (K)@ dAf +K]-@ is used to 
express an agent’s capacity to evolve by a K-action into an agent that satisfies the 
property ~0. To give a simple example, the semantics yield II[K]flffl = {P I K(P) c s}, 
so a state has this property iff it cannot (immediately) perform an action a E K. 
Dually, P + (K) tt iff P can immediately perform some action a E K (i.e., a K-action 
is possible). 
For a temporal example, consider vZ.Y A [K]Z (where for simplicity we suppose Z 
is not free in Y). To understand this property just apply the semantics: 
1lvZ.Y A [K]Z\j = U{g I 8G IlYll n {P I P’ E K(P) implies P’ E 8)) 
This fixed point formula therefore specifies a set of states that is closed under ac- 
tions drawn (only) from the set K, each of which satisfies the property Y. If a model 
is to have this property the initial state must satisfy Y, and all states reachable via 
a sequence of K actions must satisfy Y. In practice a global invariant is often re- 
quired, in which case K is the universal set of actions, and we write vZ.Y A [-]Z 
instead. 
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Properties of geographic data: With these intuitions we can begin to express inter- 
esting temporal properties of the model of the SSI sketched in the previous subsection. 
For example, a property of routes that is of interest is the following [20]: 
If a route is locked, its component sub-routes are locked. 
The intention is this property is always true-i.e., it should be an invariant (or safety 
property) of the data. With reference to Fig. 1, the modal formula 
‘y def ((ObS,&))tt =+ (obs+l))tt) A ((Ob+$))tt =+ (ObSqab(l))tt) 
characterises all Control states satisfying a slightly stronger property for R9s (the syntax 
(a) is used instead of ({a}) f or a single action). This is a safety property of the data iff: 
Control + vZ.Y A [-]Z 
This may be verified, at least in principle, using the model checker Cleaveland im- 
plemented in the Concurrency Workbench [7,8]. In general, however, model checking 
is unlikely to be able to resolve this question. Groote puts the reachable space of the 
Hoorn-Kersenboogerd interlocking (a small one) somewhere between 103’ and lOso 
states [13]: larger exponents arise in SSI, and these structures have little discernible 
regularity. However, model checking is an effective tool for analysing the remote route 
request protocol because the algorithm is described only by the eight rules in Fig. 3. 
We can therefore work with a rather small abstraction ( lo4 to lo5 states, depending 
on the capacity of the buffers needed). 
5. Modelling remote route locking 
The interlockings connected to the internal data link are loosely synchronised with 
one another, and the lower layers of the inter-SSI communications protocol ensure each 
SSI places its outgoing telegram data onto the bus at least once every major cycle. For 
the formal model we shall tighten this and suppose each SSI broadcasts exactly once 
every major cycle. These communication events are used to clock the system. We shall 
further assume, erring on the side of pessimism, that each major cycle consumes one 
‘second’ of elapsed time-i.e., the model’s timers will count major cycles. Any lossy 
behaviour of the link can be emulated in the input or output buffers, but we suppose 
to begin with that the link is a perfect medium. 
5.1. Building blocks of a CCS model of SSI 
Although the SSI control loop is sequential, a parallel specification is considerably 
more intelligible. We therefore extend the Control of Section 4.1 with the elements 
needed for remote route locking-a timer which is indexed by the timeout period t, a 
(bounded) queue to buffer inputs, a telegram, and a one place buffer for the output: 
(Control I W4 I QWl> I G(O) I QuW)\M 
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Et(m) &?J ?&&(m).E,(m) + pu&(n).E,(n) + sync&(m + I) ifo 5 m < t 
Et(m) s &&(m).Et(m) t put,(n).E,(n) + stop.Et(stop) ifm = t 
Et(m) 2 &&(m).E,(m) t put,(n).E,(n) + sync.&(m) if m = stop 
Que(q) $2 qin(e).Que(q@e) ifq = [] 
Que(s) g qin(e).Que(q@e) +%(e’).Que(q’) if q = [e’lq’] 
G(U) E s&u).G(O) t pub(w).G(v) foru E 0 
Out(u) z idl_OUt(U).enn.get,(v).Out(v) for u E 0 
Fig. 6. Generic components to model inter-S% communications. 
The restriction set M intemalises the channels by which the components communicate 
but leaves the Image observable as before. The elements of this model are gathered 
together in Fig. 6, and the paragraphs below explain what each is designed to achieve. 
Elapsed Timer: The timers are stopped by the timeout rule (6) which is executed 
once a major cycle. This behaviour is modelied here with a watchdog timer that may 
be started, stopped, or reset by the data, but which is otherwise stopped by an external 
action stop. This simple version increments the counter on each sync action which 
represents the start of the next major cycle. The timer cannot synchronise again once 
it has counted up to t < stop: it must be stopped explicitly via stop, or reset (from 
Data via put,(m), for 0 <m < stop). This formulation reflects the notion that while 
the timeout is programmed in the sub-route release data, it is undesirable to specify in 
which minor cycle the relevant rule is to be executed-because, although the execution 
order is fixed, it is arbitrary and we should therefore assume nothing about it. The 
timeout is represented by the watchdog action stop which if it occurs must do so in 
the (t - n)th major cycle after the timer was started with n. 
Queue Process: The specification of the input ring-buffer is data orientated. Let [ ] rep- 
resent the empty queue, [elq] represent the queue whose first element is e and whose tail 
is q, and q @e represent append. This agent will synchronise with Control in recording 
IDL inputs through qin, and again in removing panel requests through set (see below). 
Other inputs, i.e., from the control panel, will be queued directly through qin. Here e, 
e’ E 22, the set of all panel and remote requests-eg., for EAST 3 = { 975, A75,. . .}. 
We let the null (or empty) telegram 0 E 9, but to be precise we should add that the 
input buffer is of bounded capacity, and that null telegrams are not actually queued. 
Telegram: Outgoing IDL telegrams are treated just like other control variables, 
except that they are automatically reset to zero when their contents are posted. The 
agent G(u) is reset whenever it is read-it is important to realise therefore that the 
only agent reading this variable is the output buffer. This buffer process, Out(u), is a 
simple cycler (for the moment, it is refined later) executing the sequence: output to the 
IDL, await the next enabling action enn in accordance with the round-robin protocol, 
and fetch the next telegram (value). The SSI can write to the link only when this 
buffer is ‘enabled’. Again, we let the null telegram 0 E 0. 
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Control: The Control is constructed just as in Section 4.1, but with an explicit 
synchronisation (with the timer) to mark the start of each major cycle. Now, in addition, 
Data may read an IDL input, queue the appropriate panel request and update the timer. 
Having read an IDL input Data also enables the output buffer for writing to the link: 
Data dAf set(q).(C[ PRR(*q) IData) + . . 
- -- 
. + idlin(e).qin(e).sync.enn.Data 
This control loop is composed with the output buffer and the timer, e.g., 
(Data 1 Out(u) 1 E,(m))\{enn,sync) 
so that the model is ‘clocked on input’-i.e. we have arranged to increment the timer 
on each input from the other interlocking before enabling the output telegram. Since 
(both of) the interlockings connected to the link implement the same protocol, this 
ensures a (logical) one cycle delay between outputs, or inputs, and gives the model a 
simple clocking mechanism. 
5.2. Matching up the interfaces for East and West 
Each of the components discussed above captures a separate function of the generic 
program. The restriction set M binds these components together, and is chosen so the 
visible actions include 
{idlin(e) 1 e E X} inputs from the other interlocking, 
{idl_out(e) 1 e E Co} outputs to the other interlocking, 
{qin(e) 1 e E 22 - 9) panel requests from the signal control panel, 
as well as the watchdog action stop. Again, let 0 E 9. Then compose two such systems, 
say East, and West,, so that they synchronise on the IDL transmissions: 
EastWest, dAf (East,[idlin(e)/idl_out(e) 1 e E CoE][stop,/stop] 
1 West,[idlin(e)/idl_out(e) 1 e E Ow][stop,/stop] 
)\ {idlin(e) 1 e E 0~ U 0~) 
This recalls the relabelling notation: P[f] 3 P’[f ] whenever P -% P’, where f is 
a function mapping actions to actions with the properties f(r) = z and f(Z) = f(a). 
The set 6~ is the union of two disjoint sets of messages: the requests sent from 
WEST to EAST, and the set of WEST’S replies to the requests received from EAST. Without 
loss of generality assume that the sets of control variables 9~ and 9~ are disjoint, 
and that the interface to the coupled system is specified by the sets {sin(e) ( e E 
(2?~--.9~)~(2?~-Y~)}, and {stop,,stop,} to represent the timeouts in EAST and WEST 
respectively. In particular, the rules implementing the remote route request protocol 
are distributed between EAST and WEST as indicated in Fig. 3, and the route-specific 
data are omitted (as is rule (6) since the timeout is implemented by the watchdog 
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mechanism instead). Then 0~ = {QN, QZ} = 9~, 0~ = {AN, AZ} = YE, and .&-OE = 
{QN,QNX} are the control panel inputs to EAST to select or cancel the ‘route’ (EAST’S 
route cancellation is unconditional in this model). 
5.3. Formal properties of the remote route request protocol 
From Section 3.3 recall that the safety property associated with the protocol was 
stated thus: it is never possible to arrive at a situation where only the jirst half [of 
the cross-boundary route] is locked. We can recognise that the route is locked in WEST 
by the condition Tib 1, which is to say (oby(l))tt, but how should we recognise 
whether or not the route is locked in EAST? In fact the requirement is strengthened: 
whenever the last sub-route of the first part of the route is locked, the first 
sub-route of the second part is locked. 
This also assures the route is not prematurely released by WEST. The formula 
therefore characterises the unsafe states in EastWest,. (However, the validity of this 
characterisation relies on a property of the sub-route release data (in EAST) mentioned 
in Section 2.3-namely, that sub-routes are released in correct sequence. Fortunately, 
this property is easy to verify [20].) The invariant required is that 0 is false in all 
reachable states: E dAf vz.70 A [-12. 
Given an initial state in which all the sub-routes are free the model checker in the 
Concurrency Workbench confirms that: 
EastWest k vZ.(-)tt A [-]Z : Freedom from deadlock, 
EastWest k ((qin(QN)))((obs@)))tt : Can set the outward route, 
EastWe& k 8 : Safety. 
The ((a)) modality abstracts from the z transitions (the internal activity) of the model: 
somewhat loosely ((a))@ = (z)*(a)(z)*@ (see [25] where the precise definition is given 
in terms of ,u, (z), and (a)). With the simulation facilities of the Concurrency Work- 
bench it is easy to confirm that the circumstances identified in Section 3.3 lead to states 
satisfying 0: messages can remain in the input buffer for arbitrary periods of time. 
6. Strengthening the safety case 
If the problem arises from the possibility that panel requests can remain in the queue 
indefinitely, perhaps the situation can be repaired by eliminating such arbitrary delays? 
This introduces the idea that IDL inputs should expire if they have been queuing “too 
long” (a parameter one might wish to adjust). A solution of this kind is described 
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below, and in Section 6.2 we shall examine the effect on the protocol of an imperfect 
communication medium. 
6.1. Eliminating arbitrary delays 
The elimination of arbitrary delays can be achieved by modifying the queue process 
so that panel requests are given integral timestamps: 
Quei(q) dAf 
{ 
qIn(e).Appi(q, id&(e)) ifq=[] 
qin(e).Appi(q, id&(e)) + set(e’).Quei(q’) if q = [e;lq’] 
Appi(q, e,) ‘kf if (e E 9) then Quei(age(q) Be,) else Quei(q @e,) 
The append i%nction now adds input e with its timestamp (the suffix) to the queue. 
The function id& computes the initial timestamp for a panel request e E 9: idli(e) = 
zj” e E 9 then ei eke eo, and i 2 1 is chosen to be the maximum length of time (the 
number of major cycles) a message can delay in the buffer. The function age removes 
from the queue all elements that have a timestamp of 1 (i.e., el), and decrements all 
non-zero timestamps. With Appi(q,e,) we arrange that age is only applied when an 
IDL input is received. Control panel inputs (e E 9 - 9) do not expire. 
With these modifications we can submit EastW&(,i) to the model checker for anal- 
ysis. Now, in addition to the other properties cited above: 
The model has therefore demonstrated that if the SSI processes all remote requests in 
under one major cycle, the protocol is safe. 
The reason EastWest(5,2) k fi - is quite simple: if the model is to be safe when i = 2 
the acknowledgement from WEST must arrive at EAST not later than the third tick (see 
Fig. 5). However, this cannot be guaranteed if the remote route request can languish 
in WEST’S input buffer more than one major cycle. Note that the duration of the first 
‘major cycle’ can be very short, but not less that one minor cycle in the model, nor 
in the SSI. The result that EastWest(5,1) b G _ is important because it gives a strong 
indication of why the SSI is safe-in practice the input buffers never fill up, and panel 
requests are delayed no more than a few minor cycles. However, it would be better to 
be categorical about this. 
6.2. Lossy communications and duplicating telegrams 
The rate at which panel requests are served is not the only, nor even the likely, 
source of delays which the SSI has to tolerate. More seriously, a third SSI may be in- 
volved in locking a route that traverses more than one interlocking boundary. Moreover, 
IDL telegrams may occasionally be lost due to imperfections in the communications 
166 M. J. Morley/Science of Computer Programming 29 (1997) 147-I 70 
0)-O- 
iiIixz(0) 
L-----r 
idl_out(O) @@--y 
enn f----iEg~O 
k&O) 0 ;i-@Q~ 
Fig. 7. Introducing lossy link behaviour, and duplicating telegrams. 
medium. In order to accommodate occasional bus errors the SSI generic program is in 
fact configured to copy non-null telegrams to the link on two successive occasions. If 
a data packet is corrupted in transit, or ‘lost’, the transport layer will ensure that the 
null telegram is received-this is always a safe input. 
In order to model faults on the link, and telegram duplication, we modify the output 
buffer, Out(v), as depicted in Fig. 7. When no remote route request is in progress the 
process cycles around the left-hand loop; when the telegram is written however, the 
value is copied twice-through Out’(u) and Out(u), and both agents can (nondeter- 
ministically) transmit the null telegram instead. 
If the two interlockings exchange messages only once a major cycle the loss (or fail- 
ure) of a remote route request, followed by the loss of the first reply, can lead to several 
seconds’ delay. The reader will not be surprised, therefore, that EastWestpl) p 8. The 
lossy link introduces a maximum of six delay cycles between issuing the remote route 
request (rule l), and processing the acknowledgement (rule 2). 
That said, there is one parameter in the protocol that can be adjusted with ease: the 
hitherto arbitrary timeout observed by the elapsed timers, currently set to five major 
cycles. By the formal analysis we are now able to suggest much more precisely what 
value this should take if the protocol is to be safe. Six delay cycles can accumulate 
when i = 1 because the output buffer in East may be in the state Out’(QZ) when rule 
(1) is processed, so naturally: 
Intriguingly, this is false! A new failure mode has been introduced by the duplication 
of telegrams, a reincarnation of the failure identified in Section 3.3. WEST will send 
at most two high priority reply telegrams (although it receives two requests, at most 
one of these will succeed when i = 1 because of the timer test). When the first 
acknowledgement is processed in EAST the elapsed timer will be stopped whether or 
not the route is locked. However, before the second acknowledgement is returned 
the timer may well be restarted by another request for a cross-boundary route. Ergo, 
EastWest(7,1) F 8. 
Now there are two cases to consider: either rule (2) succeeds and locks the route, or 
it does not succeed (because the route-specific availability conditions have changed). 
In the present model we only examine the former 
EastWest(7,l) k lqin(QN)jj(vZ.l@ A [-qin(QNX)]Z) 
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where qin(QNX) is the control panel input to East that cancels the route. Given a 
safe initial state, this property (which does hold) asserts that whenever the cross- 
boundary route is requested 10 remains invariant at least until such time as the route 
is subsequently cancelled. (The [-a] modality means any action other than a, and BuJ 
is the dual of ((a)).) 
Apropos the possibility that the route is no longer available in the first interlocking 
when the acknowledgement is received the main reference [4] notes that 
this can only be due to failure, overrun, or signalman error. 
Assuming this to be correct, the first two possibilities (failure of the computer or 
signalling hardware, or a train overrunning a signal at red) can be reasonably ignored 
as these will have long-term effect. But the effect of an error on the part of the operator 
who could, for example, select a route only to immediately cancel it again, is difficult 
to predict. 
However, we do not need to resort to informal argument against this failure occur- 
ring. Observe that once the priority acknowledgement (i.e., AN) has been received, any 
subsequent copies are redundant: one need only record the identity of the last input, 
and discard the copies. The second modification 
Data kf set(Q).(C[ PRR(*Q) I]Data) + . . . + idlin(v).Filter(v) 
Filter(v) dAf get,(u).if (u = u) then Sync(O) else Sync(v) 
- 
Sync(v) dzf pufH( v).qin(v).sync.enn.Data 
introduces such a filter, a variable Reg,(u) for u E 9, to record the identity of the 
last IDL telegram received. In the then branch of the filter the queuing action (viz. - 
qin(0)) ensures the timestamps of queued IDL inputs are adjusted even though the 
current input is discarded. Then indeed EastWestc7,tJ k E, but EastWest F 3. 
7. Impact and conclusions 
In Section 3.3 we showed that there is a logical flaw in the remote route request 
protocol which could, in principle, lead to unsafe states in the railway. The question is 
whether those extremely long delays in processing panel route requests, delays that are 
of the order of several major cycles, are credible? Such delays are unlikely, although 
in practice the rate at which panel requests are served is not the deciding factor: there 
are (combinations of) circumstances in which delays may accumulate-interlockings at 
a busy junction having a naturally long major cycle; a glitch on the IDL; a long route 
that straddles more than one interlocking boundary. 
The results in Section 6.1 demonstrate that the acknowledgement o a remote route 
request cannot be processed after the timeout as long as the rate at which panel requests 
are served guarantees they do not remain in the input buffer for more than one major 
cycle (not one second). The formal analysis therefore demonstrates that this is a safety 
requirement. However, the results in Section 6.2 indicate it is not sufficient because the 
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practice of acknowledging each remote route request twice can still lead to hazardous 
states, with or without the delays envisaged in Fig. 5. 
The formal analysis brings forward several concrete recommendations for the im- 
plementation of the remote route request protocol. It is therefore important to consider 
the overall impact these would have. 
Ring buJjTer: This requires a more complex algorithm and data structure than presently 
implemented. The age function need not unlink requests that have been buffered too 
long-only mark them as invalid. Inevitably this slows the generic program, but ac- 
cording to [4] only in minor cycles that are otherwise lightweight. 
Elapsed timer: Lengthening the timeout observed by the elapsed timers involves a 
change in the geographic data (rule 6) 
if EC’ then E=stop fi. 
and a two second longer pause before the telegram can be reused. 
Filter variables: The filter can be implemented highly efficiently, and storage require- 
ments are modest since only one filter variable is needed for each IDL telegram. (Other 
possible solutions have been investigated in the model: one is to send IDL telegrams 
once only because then the timeout can be left at five seconds, as in Section 6.1.) 
Deadlocks: If the acknowledgement to a remote route request expires, the system 
may enter a state in which only the second part of the route is locked. In particular, the 
dummy outward sub-route will be free, so the remote route release mechanism cannot 
clear the route in WEST. A change to (1) and (4) avoids this: 
*QN if @CN-E,E=stop then Z,““l,E=O,G=m fi. 
*AZ if E=stop,T,aCf then Zrf fi. 
Locking ZF in rule (2) is then not necessary. Now the dummy inward sub-route is free 
in WEST whenever the dummy outward sub-route is free in EAST (a desirable property 
the original protocol does not enjoy): 
EastWest(7,1) k vZ.((obsz7(f))tt + (ob+;b(f))tt) A [-]Z 
This cannot lead to an unwanted cancelling of a route in the other SSI. 
The model in Section 5 is pessimistic in that it assumes worst case behaviour and 
considers only the binary case (although it is easy to generalise). However, Section 6 
demonstrates that remote route locking can be safely implemented in this case, in- 
dependently of the rate at which panel requests are served. The value of the result 
depends on whether the model is accepted as an abstraction of the system’s behaviour, 
but any valid model should admit the worst case behaviour we have assumed. 
That remote route locking can be safely implemented is encouraging, but the revision 
does not guarantee ‘safety’ alone as there were two requirements: 
(1) the cross-boundary route is locked only if it is available in both interlockings; 
(2) it is never possible to arrive at a situation where only the first harf is locked. 
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The former, however, mainly depends on the route-specific geographic data. Clearly, 
errors here may undermine the integrity of the SSI, so it is important these data be 
safe. As indicated in Section 2.4, this is an issue several railway authorities are actively 
addressing by acquiring the necessary formal methods skills. Indeed, we should expect 
formal methods to play a central role in the medium to long term in the certification 
of interlocking design at this level. 
This brings to a close our scrutiny of the inter-SSI communications. The reader may 
be puzzled, at this point, why the weaknesses identified in Sections 3.3 and 6.2 did not 
come to light sooner. The answer is not that the SSI was designed without the aid of 
formal methods (although it is true that it was not); rather, it is because the author came 
to consider the problem with no preconceptions about how long the system takes to pro- 
cess panel requests. In practice panel requests are buffered for no more than a few minor 
cycles and their rate of arrival is low enough to ensure that there is never a backlog. 
Yet it is clear that formal description techniques, and particularly formal proof, can 
bring deep insight into the nature of an algorithm such as the remote route request 
protocol. The question then is whether such analysis as is advocated here is presently 
with reach of engineering practice? That depends on which engineering discipline one is 
referring to. The mechanism to translate geographic data to CCS (or similar formalism) 
is automatic, and the proofs themselves automated, so as long as signalling engineers 
want to design protocols in geographic data the framework we have established can be 
adapted for use by persons not necessarily expert in process algebra and temporal logic. 
However, the problems we have addressed are not really those of signalling engineering 
(interlocking design), but of computer systems engineering where one does expect to 
find expertise in formal methods. 
Having said that it is perhaps the first step of the analysis presented which the most 
significant: to extract the eight generic rules on page 153 (nothing like this appears in 
[4]). Why are these rules expressed in the geographic data at all? With this abstraction 
we can begin to discuss whether it might not be better, in the design of the next 
generation of Solid State Interlocking, to move this logic into the generic program. 
This would remove a rich source of potential design errors by simplifying the signalling 
engineer’s task of devising the geographic data for each new installation of the system. 
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